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Abstract: In the article, the key features of development of national corporate case frame in Ukraine 
are considered. It is retained that the legislation of Ukraine from point of presence of the formal generally 
accepted measures on defiance of rights for a shareholder can be appraised as highly developed enough. Thus, 
the personal touch of redistribution of equity in the Ukrainian corporate sector is prevailing of property of 
insiders.  The folded  situation  allows talking  about steady  and fundamental  contradiction  of the formed 
national system of corporate management. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Among the key features of the national model of the corporate governance development in 
Ukraine it should be identified:  a permanent  process  of property redistribution in  corporations, 
insiders specific motivations  associated with  the control  of financial  flows and the  "output" of 
corporate  assets,  the  weak  role  of  the  traditional  "external"  corporate  governance  mechanisms, 
inefficient or politicized State enforcement.  
In Ukraine, as in continental Europe, is used the generally accepted division of the rights into 
public (the organization of the state and its relations with individuals) and private (the regulation and 
protection of the interests of individuals). Private law, in its turn, is divided into two main parts: civil 
(general rules governing the relations of individuals) and trade (the ratio of individuals with regard to 
the recovery of profits). "Trade Association" is regarded as a branch of commercial law, and the "joint 
stock  companies",  in  its  turn,  as  part  of  the  "trade  associations"  ("economic  partnerships  and 
companies"). 
Another formal difference is the specification (or lack thereof) of company law norms in special 
laws. The special laws related to the joint-stock companies (JSC) (other than codes) are currently 
available in most countries, such as France (the law of trade associations in 1966), Germany (the law 
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on joint stock companies in 1965). Almost in all countries with transitive economy JSC are already 
the subject of a particular type of legal regulation. 
Hungary was the first that went along with the French way (Company Law 1988, amended 
1991). Similar legislation (where JSC is regulated on a par with other companies or partnerships) has 
been adopted in Albania, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Russia and Ukraine. 
The paper (Кубліков, 2008) shows that none of the existing models of corporate governance is 
perfect.  Similarly,  no  other  country  has  reached  a  100  percent  level  of  most  conciliatory 
implementation of Principles of Corporate Governance in terms of international practice the OECD 
(OECD, 1999). The most developed countries walked closer to it then other, primarily belonging to 
the Anglo-American legal system. This is followed by the country's civil law. 
The analysis of the Ukrainian legislation in terms of availability of formal common measures 
for the protection of shareholder rights shows that it can be rated as sufficiently highly developed. Of 
course, in the domestic legislation on joint stock companies there is a significant adoption of the 
Anglo-American protection mechanisms of shareholder rights. However, the general traditions of 
European civil law remain dominant, which determines the proximity of Ukrainian corporate law to 
the standards of EU legislation on formal criteria set forth in the Regulations and Directives of the 
European Council (Database of EU legislation on http://www.europa.eu/) (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - The basic norms of company law presence in Ukraine and the EU 
Norms  Ukraine  EU 
Tight and detailed procedure for creating a joint-stock 
company 
Yes  Yes 
Tough and detailed procedure for maintaining the size of the 
authorized capital stock 
Yes  Yes 
Regulation of creation of branches, representative offices 
and other separate units 
Yes  Yes (in reporting) 
The main issues of reorganization  Yes  Yes 
The possibility of company with one participant  Yes  Yes (for closed / private 
companies) 
Pre-emptive right to purchase the shares by shareholders  Yes  Yes 
Stringent requirements for reporting and auditing  Yes  Yes 
Absorption and protection of minority rights  Yes (details required)  The general principles 
under discussion 
Bankruptcy  Yes (a modification of 
legislation needed) 
Yes (minimum) 
Insider transactions  Yes (minimum)  Yes (outright ban) 
Liquidation  Yes  No 
 
On the other hand, the analysis of the mechanism of the property structure formation and its 
redistribution in Ukrainian specifics suggests that this mechanism is primarily performs the functions  
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associated  with  the  struggle  for  control  of  the  company.  Typical  feature  of  the  share  capital 
redistribution in Ukrainian corporate sector is the dominance of insider ownership (Table 2). 
The analysis of Table 2 suggests that from 2003 to 2009 there was a decrease in the company’s 
capital share for shareholders who own less than 15% and an increase the share of owners who own 
more than 80% of the share capital. Thus, the structure of share ownership, which has developed in 
the Ukrainian economy, can be characterized as highly concentrated. 
 
Table 2 - Changes in the proportion of owners in joint stock companies in Ukraine (as for January 1) 
Year  Shareholders portion in the company who own more than 5% of share capital (%) 
  <15  15-20  >20-30  >30-40  >40-50  >50-60  >60-70  >70-80  >80-100 
2003  27,6  5,2  6,0  8,3  8,7  12,1  10,8  9,7  11,6 
2004  21,2  4,9  5,7  7,8  9,5  11,4  11,0  12,2  16,3 
2005  21,0  3,9  5,4  6,7  8,0  10,1  12,1  14,5  18,3 
2006  10,8  3,2  4,8  6,2  7,4  9,9  14,5  17,5  23,9 
2007  4,8  3,8  11,0  6,1  9,5  10,0  11,1  12,1  31,6 
2008  4,5  3,7  10,4  6,4  9,2  9,4  11,5  12,6  32,3 
2009  4,5  3,7  9,9  6,0  8,7  9,6  12,5  11,6  33,6 
 
Based on the above, as well as taking into account a number of empirical data we can talk about 
sustainable and fundamental contradiction emerging national system of corporate governance. Its 
essence lies in the fact that in the current system two fundamentally different approaches coexisting: 
1.  Concentration  of  share  capital,  which  implies  a  minimum  of  legal  protection  of 
shareholders; 
2.  Anglo-Saxon  legal  tradition,  which  is  characterized  by  maximization  of  minority 
shareholders legal protection. 
This combination of approaches has led to the unique situation of reciprocal neutralization: 
•  On the one hand, the concentration of the share capital and the gradual reduction in the 
proportion of minority shareholders in principle reduces the importance of a broad legal 
instruments  of  minority  shareholders  protection  in  terms  of  the  corporate  sector  in 
general, and the tools themselves to protect small shareholders are transformed into 
instruments of corporate blackmailing; 
•  On the other hand, the establishment of a comprehensive system of legal protection of 
shareholders, in turn, hampers the further process of concentration of share capital (as a 
factor of the inverse effect of the right of economic processes). 
In this case, it should be noted that the protection of their interests through further concentration 
– it is the prerogative of large shareholders, primarily for ordered enforcement.  
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In this regard, an important issue is the existence of economic and institutional prerequisites for 
attraction to a particular classical model of corporate governance. 
The model with the domination of minority shareholders’ interests is not impossible in Ukraine, 
as it quite complicated in practice. The implementation of such a model would require a serious 
economic breaking of the existing relationship. Sharp focus in favor of the interests of minority 
shareholders violates the balance of interests of all the other subjects of corporate relations. The role 
of minority shareholders, however, is crucial to ensure the corporate transparency. 
However, the lack of legal protection of minority shareholders and the relatively low level of 
stock market development related in both direct and inverse feedbacks. The lack of liquidity of the 
majority of the shares of domestic corporations on the weak development of the stock market makes 
their owners substantially even less protected. The presence of such a situation, in its turn, promotes 
the concentration of corporate ownership and reduction of stock market mobility. 
In fact, disparate components of all the traditional models are now formally presented in 
Ukraine: 
•  relatively dispersed ownership with illiquid stock market and weak institutional investors; 
•  steady trend towards concentration of ownership and control; 
•  elements of cross-holdings and the formation of complex corporate structures of different 
types. 
Such a blurring of the Ukrainian model creates evident difficulties for decision-making in the 
field of economic policy and the law. 
A type of financial system that dominates in the country provides a particular importance on 
the formation of a national corporate governance model. The main feature, constituting a particular 
type of financial system is the role of commercial banks in providing activity and financing of 
industrial corporations. Depending on the value of banks in long-term financing of economic growth 
can be spoken about either a banking-oriented, or a market-oriented financial system. 
Nowadays, there is a situation where none of the above types of financial systems do not only 
prevaile, but, more importantly, functioning in isolation from industrial corporations in Ukraine. The 
banking model of economic growth proved to be ineffective in the late 90s of the last century, and in 
2008  -  2009.  The  stock  market  as  a  potential  mechanism  for  financial  resources  mobilization 
throughout the time of its development was unable to cope with the tasks.  
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As a result, the only reliable option for which you can try to determine the attraction to a 
particular type of financial system is the structure and level of concentration of the share capital, 
which determines the form of the right of control. 
Assuming that the result of many stages of redistribution of property in Ukraine will be a highly 
concentrated ownership, legal disclosure requirements in existing and even more tightening form 
does not have a real foundation. Moreover, they are also extremely poorly executed now. 
The problem of selective law enforcement by order of interested private organizations – a key 
drawback of modern domestic model, that is systemic and cannot be rectified by editing regulations 
and codes of corporate governance. 
The Ukrainian model of corporate governance is formed in two parallel trends: 
•  Managers are gradually becoming the controlling shareholders of the corporation, i.e. key 
feature  is  the  "capitalism  of  Governors",  which  became  the  owners  or  "insider 
capitalism"; 
•  external  shareholders,  as  the  consolidate  control  themselves,  begin  to  function  as 
managers  or  transfer  those  functions  to  an  authorized  representative  of  a  group  of 
shareholders  associated  with  them  not  by  a  formal  contract,  but  by  a  whole  set  of 
economic and non-economic interests. 
Obviously, this is a forced situation, which is connected with a number of circumstances. 
Firstly, the continued merging of functions due to the fact that under the current external 
environment ("gray" schemes of corporate finance "tax optimization", control of financial flows, asset 
stripping, etc.), and the continued trend of struggle for control, the formal owner must remove the 
risk of loss at the same time both the property title and control of financial flows. 
Second, the system is organized on the principle of two, three, four partners that share both 
property (control), and business. There are at least two problems in such public corporations. 
The first problem is concerns the short-term investments. It is necessary to take into account 
that many domestic corporations are guided by the foreign profit centers, and their ongoing activities 
make the most of the internal sources, including the pseudo-foreign loans, etc. It should be noted that 
in the period 2003-2007 reinvestment process is enhanced, by Ukrainian owners, and namely in the 
practice  of  various  forms  of  pseudo-foreign  investment.  Consequently,  the  requirement  of 
transparency insurance of ownership structure and finance, i.e. every tightening of enforcement, could 
indicate the break of the re-investment process from abroad.  
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The  second  problem  is  the  accomplishment  of  a  long-term  investment  strategy  in  such 
corporations. The system of partnership involves focus on current short-term profits, and thus there 
are problems regarding the negotiation and implementation of a long-term investment strategy. It is 
obvious that such an organization involves a strict system to minimize the losses associated with the 
opportunistic behavior of managers. 
The ability to use the Ukrainian banking system as a driver of corporate governance and 
financing has been adopted by the beginning of this century and brought negative results. At present, 
banks are still not able to carry out long-term external financing of the real sector of the economy due 
to the insufficient domestic capital and short-term liabilities. 
Some countries, with a transitive economy, were able to use foreign direct investment to 
stimulate corporate investment and restructuring. 
It should be noted that the corporate governance model, based on a broad presence of foreign 
strategic investors in key sectors of the economy, requires a stable and carefully cultivated political 
climate (in this case, the stability is crucial, as the example of China). Although Ukraine's foreign 
direct investment should be a priority in some industries, a significant influx in the medium term is 
unlikely to happen.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
As a result one can identify the following fundamental processes: for the prospects of forming 
a national model of corporate governance 
•  latency of the separation of ownership and control process will remain in the medium 
term; 
•  the financial system of Ukraine in its present precarious state does not evaluate the 
attraction of national systems of corporate governance in any classical models; 
•  concentration of share capital is an obvious process by which takes place not only the 
consolidation of control, but also the realization of economic methods of "self-sufficient" 
model of corporate governance; 
•  legal innovations in the field of corporate law itself (shareholder rights) are largely 
reached its peak in terms of current economic conditions; 
•  methods  of  protection  of  shareholders'  rights  cannot  be  further  developed  without 
adequate general measures in the area of enforcement.  
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